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Abstract
Stalnaker provided an example of a perfect information game in which common
knowledge of rationality does not yield backward induction. However, in his example,
knowledge is treated as defeasible: players forfeit their knowledge of rationality at
some vertices. This is not how ‘knowledge’ is understood in epistemology where,
unlike belief, it is not subject to revision. In this respect, the Stalnaker example is a
fit for ‘rationality and common belief of rationality’ rather than ‘common knowledge of
rationality.’ In order to represent knowledge in the belief revision setting we introduce
the notion of ‘robust knowledge’ which is maintained whenever possible during belief
revision. We show that robust knowledge of Stalnaker rationality in games of perfect
information yields backward induction.
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Introduction

Stalnaker’s approach to games of perfect information (PI games) introduces belief revision
into players’ reasoning ([8]). The paradigmatic example is given by the common interest
game in Figure 1. In Aumann’s setting ([1]), given common knowledge of rationality, players
play the backward induction solution (aaa), i.e., across at all three nodes. Stalnaker’s
approach claims that the solution (dda), i.e., down at v1 , down at v2 , and across at v3 can
be regarded as rational under ‘the same’ assumption of common knowledge of rationality.
Stalnaker’s reasoning proceeds as follows. Consider the variant of the game in which
(dda) is common knowledge. Then it is common knowledge that both players are rational,
but the only solution, (dda), is not the backward induction solution.
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Figure 1: Stalnaker’s game
It suffices to check that both players are rational in (dda); this would yield the common
knowledge of rationality since (dda) is common knowledge.
• Ann is rational at v3 according to the game tree.
• Bob is rational at v2 since if Ann were to play across (an obviously irrational move
by Ann given her knowledge that Bob is playing down), then Bob revises his initial
belief of Ann’s rationality and no longer assumes that Ann will play across at v3 .
Under these circumstances, playing down at v2 is not irrational for Bob.
• Ann is rational at v1 since she knows that Bob is playing down.
In this proof, the heart of the matter is how Bob would react to being surprised by Ann’s
(irrational) move across at v1 . There are various possibilities:
1. Bob revises some of his beliefs, including his belief in Ann’s rationality for the remainder of the game;
2. Bob revises some of his beliefs, but not his belief in Ann’s rationality for the remainder
of the game.
Stalnaker describes what happens when the first possibility is allowed, which makes good
sense. This case was cast in a formal logical framework in [4].
We offer a general logical treatment of the second case. In the context of the ‘knowledge
of rationality,’ it leads to the backward induction solution, BI, in all PI games.1 Our goal
is not to defend or attack BI, but to formulate the underlying issues fully and formally.
How is our approach different from Aumann’s? Aumann obtains BI, but not via this
route. In his treatment, there is no explicit belief revision. In contrast, we allow belief revision, but knowledge of (Stalnaker) rationality for the remainder of the game is maintained.
1

Stalnaker in [8] also indicates that in case 2, the game in Figure 1 will end in the backward induction
solution, BI. While discussing general notions of “robust belief in rationality” and “rationalization principle” which correspond to case 2, Stalknaker points out that they lead to a potentially infinite tower of
belief revision priorities which quickly loses intuitive plausibility.
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There is a principal point at which our approach differs from that of Stalnaker. Stalnaker’s basic epistemic assumptions concern belief rather than knowledge: while assuming ‘knowledge of rationality,’ Stalnaker’s players treat knowledge as defeasible whereas
since Descartes, epistemology has usually attributed to knowledge a certain degree of nondefeasibility (infallibility, reliability, truth-tracking, necessity, etc., cf. [5, 6, 7, 9]). What
is known is true in a robust way and is not subject to revision. Defeasibility, openness
to revision, is a property of belief (hence ‘belief revision’) rather than of knowledge. The
standard game-theoretical assumption
common knowledge of players’ rationality

(1)

does not suggest the possibility of revising the rules of the game, payoffs, or rationality
assumptions. Belief revision’s approach to PI games is a fit for the assumption
players’ rationality and common belief of players’ rationality,

(2)

which is itself a fascinating subject that is not, however, identical to studying games with
assumption (1). Note that (2) has been formalized in the belief-based literature in various
ways (cf. [2, 3]) and these also allow solution (dda) for the game in Figure 1.
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Models of rationality and belief revision

Let us recap basic terminology ([1, 4]). An extensive game consists of the following components.
1. A finite set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of players.
2. A finite rooted tree H. Each node has a unique path from the root called the history
of this node. The leaves of the game tree are called terminal nodes, or outcomes. The set
of all terminal nodes is called Z.
3. A player function P that assigns a player (who makes a move) to each nonterminal
node.
4. For each player, a payoff function defined on Z.
The root node is the starting point of the game. At any node v ∈ (N \ Z), player P (v)
chooses one of the successor nodes (move).
An Aumann model is a tuple M = (Ω, K1 , . . . , Kn , s), where Ω is a set of “epistemic
states” of the world, K1 , . . . , Kn are knowledge partitions of Ω corresponding to players
1, 2, . . . , n, and s is a mapping from Ω to the set of all strategy profiles: for a state ω,
s(ω) = (s1 , . . . , sn ).
We write si (ω) for i’s component of the strategy profile s(ω), i.e., si . Also, let (s−i , si ) be
the strategy profile obtained from s by replacing si by si , hvi (s) be i’s conditional payoff if
strategy profile s is followed starting at v, and Ki (ω) be the cell in Ki that includes ω.
The definition of rationality is formalized as follows.
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Definition 1 Player i is rational at vertex v in state ω if, for all strategies si ,
hvi (s(ω 0 )) ≥ hvi (s−i (ω 0 ), si )
for some ω 0 ∈ Ki (ω). Player i is rational in state ω if i is rational at any node in ω.
Extended models formalize Stalnaker’s representation of counterfactuals via the selection function “the closest world where a given vertex is reached.” In a formal setting,
the extended model is a tuple
M = (Ω, K1 , . . . , Kn , s, f )
where (Ω, K1 , . . . , Kn , s) is an Aumann model and a selection function f maps pairs of
states and vertices to states. The intended reading of f (ω, v) = ω 0 is
ω 0 is the closest state to ω in which vertex v is reached.
It is assumed that f satisfies the following conditions:
F1. Vertex v is reached in f (ω, v).
F2. If v is reached in ω, then f (ω, v) = ω.
F3. s(f (ω, v)) and s(ω) agree on the subtree of the game tree at and below v.
Definition 2 ([4]) Player i is Stalnaker-rational in state ω at vertex v if i is rational
at vertex v in f (ω, v). Player i is Stalnaker-rational in state ω if i is Stalnaker-rational at
any of its vertices in ω.
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Common knowledge is too weak for belief revision

The principal reservation2 concerning extended models is that common knowledge of Stalnaker rationality is defeasible. It can be immediately observed that Stalnaker rationality
spills over epistemic reachability – state f (ω, v) can be unreachable from ω – which is an
indication that reachability-based common knowledge may be not adequate.
Consider, for example, the game in Figure 1. Following [4], we introduce3 the following
strategy profiles:
• s1 is the strategy profile (dda), i.e., Ann plays down at v1 , Bob plays down at v2 , and
Ann plays across at v3 ;
2

There is also the technical issue that the principle ‘players are aware of their own rationality,’ which
is usually adopted as a property of rationality, can be violated in extended models.
3
in slightly different notation
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• s2 is the strategy profile (ada);
• s3 is the strategy profile (add);
• s4 is the strategy profile (aaa) (which is the backward induction solution);
• s5 is the strategy profile (aad).
As in [4], consider extended model A = (Ω, KAnn , KBob , s, f ) where
• Ω = {ω1 , ω2 , ω3 , ω4 , ω5 };
• KAnn = {{ω1 }, {ω2 }, {ω3 }, {ω4 }, {ω5 }};
• KBob = {{ω1 }, {ω2 , ω3 }, {ω4 }, {ω5 }};
• s(ωj ) = sj for j =1–5;
• f (ω1 , v2 ) = ω2 , f (ω1 , v3 ) = ω4 , f (ω2 , v3 ) = ω4 , f (ω3 , v3 ) = ω5 , and f (ω, v) = ω in all
other situations.
The real epistemic state is assumed to be ω1 . The Stalnaker-Halpern argument claims that
Stalnaker rationality is common knowledge in ω1 .

(3)

Since ω1 is not a backward induction solution, (3) implies that in model A, common
knowledge of rationality does not yield backward induction. Let us prove (3). Since
KAnn (ω1 ) = KBob (ω1 ) = {ω1 },
everything that is true in ω1 is common knowledge in ω1 . Let us check that Stalnaker
rationality of both players holds in ω1 , in particular that Bob is Stalnaker-rational in ω1 at
v2 . Selection function f reduces this question to the claim that Bob is (Aumann-) rational
in epistemic state ω2 at vertex v2 which is established by direct application of Definition 1.
The problem is that in state ω2 at vertex v2 Bob cannot know that Ann is Stalnakerrational. Indeed, Ann is not Stalnaker-rational in ω3 (since f (ω3 , v3 ) = ω5 and Ann in not
rational in ω5 at v3 ), and ω3 ∈ KBob (ω2 ). Speaking informally, following selection function
f (ω1 , v2 ) = ω2 , Bob in ω1 revises his belief that Ann plays down at v1 and considers the
case ω2 in which Ann plays across at v1 . Accidentally, Bob also forfeits his knowledge of
Ann’s rationality at v3 , thus treating this knowledge as a mere belief.
The interpretation of the aforementioned Stalnaker-Halpern result as an example of a
PI game with condition (1) of common knowledge of rationality is not entirely convincing: rather, this game corresponds to condition (2) of rationality and common belief of
rationality.

5
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Robust knowledge of Stalnaker rationality

Common knowledge of rationality (in a given state ω) requires that rationality holds in
all reachable states, which turned out to be too weak to represent some nuances of belief
revision. In this section, we introduce a notion of robust knowledge of Stalnaker rationality
in which Stalnaker rationality holds in all relevant situations. This notion captures the
essence of belief revision under which knowledge of rationality at a vertex is maintained
whenever possible. This can also be considered as a case study which sketches a general
framework for different sorts of rationality: (Aumann) rationality is required for some
sets X of situations, i.e., pairs (state,vertex), and the choice of X is used to specify the
corresponding notion of rationality. In particular,
1. knowledge of rationality in state ω: X = {(ω, v) | v is a vertex};
2. common knowledge of rationality in state ω:
X = {(ω 0 , v) | ω 0 is reachable from ω, v is a vertex};
3. Stalnaker rationality in state ω: X = {(f (ω, v), v) | v is a vertex}.
Given an extended model M = (Ω, K1 , . . . , Kn , s, f ), a situation is a pair (ω, v) of a
state ω and vertex v of the game tree. We define a notion of relevant situation which
reflects our goal to maintain common knowledge of Stalnaker rationality for the remainder
of the game at any depth of the belief revision process. The set of situations relevant
in (ω, v) is closed under belief revision, epistemic reachability, and advancing to a later
moment in the game. Robust knowledge of Stalnaker rationality (Definition 3) is
defined then via rationality in any relevant situation.
A situation (ω 0 , v 0 ) is relevant in (ω, v), if there is a finite sequence of situations
(ω, v) = (ω0 , v0 ), (ω1 , v1 ), (ω2 , v2 ), . . . , (ωm , vm ) = (ω 0 , v 0 )
such that for each k = 0, . . . , m − 1,
1. vk  vk+1 , i.e., vk+1 is a future node with respect to vk ;
2. ωk+1 = f (f
ωk , vk+1 ) for some ω
fk reachable from ωk .
It is easy to see that to get from (ωk , vk ) to (ωk+1 , vk+1 ), one has to pick a state ω
fk reachable
from ωk (e.g., ω
fk = ωk ) and a future vertex vk+1 (e.g., vk+1 = vk ), and advance to the revised
state f (f
ωk , vk ). Iteration of this procedure generates all relevant situations.
Example 1 In model A, the set U of situations relevant in (ω1 , v3 ) is U = {(ω4 , v3 )}. The
set V of situations relevant in (ω1 , v2 ) is V = U ∪ {(ω2 , v2 ), (ω3 , v2 ), (ω5 , v3 )}. The set W
of situations relevant in (ω1 , v1 ) is W = V ∪ {(ω1 , v1 )}. Intuitively, Stalnaker rationality in
state ω1 is determined by (Aumann) rationality in five situations from W .
6

Definition 3 Robust knowledge of Stalnaker rationality in state ω at vertex v means that in
any situation (ω 0 , v 0 ) relevant in (ω, v), player P (v 0 ) is rational in ω 0 at v 0 . Robust knowledge
of Stalnaker rationality in state ω means robust knowledge of Stalnaker rationality in state
ω at v for each vertex v.
This definition justifies the notion of a ‘relevant situation’: robust knowledge of Stalnaker
rationality guarantees common knowledge of ‘Stalnaker rationality is maintained for the
remainder of the game’ in any relevant situation.
Example 2 In model A, Stalnaker rationality is common knowledge in ω1 . However,
robust knowledge of Stalnaker rationality does not hold in (ω1 , v1 ). Indeed, situation (ω5 , v3 )
is relevant in (ω1 , v1 ), but Ann is not rational in ω5 at v3 .
Example 3 Consider the length-three Centipede game in Figure 2
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Figure 2: Length-three Centipede game
and an extended model A00 = (Ω, KAnn , KBob , s, f ) where
• Ω = {ω1 , ω2 , ω3 };
• KAnn = KBob = {{ω1 }, {ω2 }, {ω3 }};
• s(ω1 ) = (ddd), s(ω2 ) = (add), s(ω3 ) = (aad);
• f (ω1 , v2 ) = ω2 , f (ω1 , v3 ) = f (ω2 , v3 ) = ω3 .
Stalnaker rationality does not hold in some situations, e.g., (ω2 , v1 ) and (ω3 , v2 ). However,
such ‘bad’ situations are irrelevant in ‘real’ state ω1 and robust Stalnaker rationality holds
in ω1 . Indeed, relevant situations in ω1 for all possible v’s are
{(ω1 , v1 ), (ω2 , v2 ), (ω3 , v3 )},
and the corresponding players are rational in all of them.
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Example 3 shows how to model belief revision while maintaining knowledge of Stalnaker
rationality for the remainder of the game in a meaningful way. Counterfactual strategy
profiles are represented in the model (states ω2 and ω3 ), but they don’t spoil rationality at
relevant vertices, which is exactly what we wanted.
The following theorem states that robust knowledge of Stalnaker rationality yields backward induction in all PI games.
Theorem 1 In extended models over generic game trees, robust knowledge of Stalnaker
rationality yields backward induction.
Proof. Let
M = (Ω, K1 , . . . , Kn , s, f )
be an extended model such that robust knowledge of Stalnaker rationality holds in state
ω of M. This yields that a corresponding player is rational in ω 0 at v 0 for each situation
(ω 0 , v 0 ) relevant in (ω, v0 ) where v0 is the root vertex. We claim that for every relevant
situation (ω 0 , v 0 ), restriction of profile s(ω 0 ) on the subtree Γ below v 0 coincides with BI.
Theorem 1 follows from this claim since (ω, v0 ) is relevant in itself and the subtree Γ below
v0 is the entire game tree.
To prove the claim, assume the opposite, i.e., that s(ω 0 ) 6= BI on the subtree Γ below
v 0 for some relevant situation (ω 0 , v 0 ). Let (ω 0 , v 0 ) be such a situation with the lowest
non-terminal vertex v 0 . Let also i be the player making a choice at v 0 .
Note that s(ω 0 ) coincides with BI at any vertex v 00 strictly below v 0 . Indeed, situation
(f (ω 0 , v 00 ), v 00 ) for any vertex v 00 strictly below v 0 is relevant, by the definition. By choice
of (ω 0 , v 0 ), s(f (ω 0 , v 00 )) coincides with BI on v 00 . By condition F3 on the selection function,
s(f (ω 0 , v 00 )) agrees with s(ω 0 ) on v 00 , hence s(ω 0 ) coincides with BI on v 00 .
Then i is not Aumann-rational at v 0 in ω 0 . Indeed, the backward induction at v 0 chooses
the best move for i given BI-moves at all other nodes of the subtree Γ below v 0 . Since the
choice of s(ω 0 ) at v 0 is different from those of BI and the game tree is generic, it can only
be strictly worse. By Definition 1, i is not rational in ω 0 at v 0 .
2
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Discussion

Extended models treat knowledge as defeasible: players revise not only their beliefs in other
players’ moves but also their ‘knowledge’ of rationality for the remainder of the game. However, in epistemology, ‘knowledge’ is usually understood as non-defeasible, and not subject
to revision. In this respect, the Stalnaker example reflects the assumption ‘rationality and
common belief of rationality’ rather than ‘common knowledge of rationality.’
The notion of robust knowledge of Stalnaker rationality reflects the idea of common
knowledge of Stalnaker rationality for the remainder of the game at any depth of the belief
revision process; it necessarily goes beyond reachability-based common knowledge.
8

For games with a ‘small’ number of irrational moves, robust knowledge of Stalnaker
rationality can be justified by strong a priori rationality reputation of players, their history
of rational behavior, etc. An isolated irrational move can be viewed as a technical error.
However, trust in rationality fades with each irrational move and given a ‘large’ number of
such moves, robust knowledge of Stalnaker rationality becomes unfeasible. More realistic
models of robust rationality should include a bound on the number of errors (e.g., one)
allowed for each player.

6

Acknowledgments

The author is grateful to Adam Brandenburger for inspiring discussions and valuable advice.
The author is indebted to Vladimir Krupski, Elena Nogina, and Cagil Tasdemir for many
useful suggestions. Special thanks to Karen Kletter for editing this paper.

References
[1] R. Aumann. Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality. Games and
Economic Behavior, 8:6–19, 1995.
[2] P. Battigalli, A. Friedenberg. Context-Dependent Forward Induction Reasoning.
Working Paper n. 351, IGIER Università Bocconi, Milano Italy August 2009.
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